






The New Science of Virtues
Abstract
Although Vico’s New	Science (NS) has been interpreted from the standpoint of practical 
philosophy, his treatment of moral virtues has largely been overlooked. I show the pivotal 
role they play in the NS, where the history of humankind is the story of how vices and virtues 
unfold, and the domain of free will is centred on the possibility of making virtues of the pas-
sions. This sheds new light on such notions as the “heterogony of ends”, the relationship 
between “bestioni” and humankind, and the threat of the “barbarism of reflection”. Also, 
it allows us to focus on fictional, mythological, and historical figures, which are exemplary 
for their virtues/vices and which provide an insight into the way virtues shape the stages 
of history. After presenting an overview of some of Vico’s sources, I argue that he engages 
in a close dialogue with the Aristotelian tradition and interprets moral virtues as a histori-
cal framework and a hermeneutical tool suitable for assessing the moral stages of human 
























New Science,	 unabridged	 translation	 of	 the	
third	edition	(1744),	with	the	addition	of	the	
“Practic	of	the	New	Science”,	transl.	by	T.	G.	
Bergin	 and	M.	H.	 Fisch,	 Cornell	University	






Pompa	translation:	G.	Vico,	The First New Sci-
ence,	ed.	and	transl.	by	L.	Pompa,	Cambridge	
University	 Press,	 Cambridge	 2002.	NS30	 is	
refered	to	by	page	number	from	the	Cristofo-
































































































See,	 for	 instance,	S.	M.	Gardiner	ed.,	Virtue 





is	 modelled	 on	 the	 Renaissance	Aristotelian	
tradition	 of	moral	 philosophy,	which	 distin-
guished	 between	 ethics,	 oeconomics	 and	
















For	 a	 synoptic	 analysis	 of	 the	 different	 ver-
sions	of	NS	book	III	about	Homer	in	the	1730	
and	in	the	1744	edition	see,	G.	Vico,	La dis-
coverta del vero Omero,	seguita	dal	Giudizio 

















































































ed., Sinn und Symbol,	Peter	Lang,	Bern	1987,	
pp.	45–64;	A.	Grafton,	“Introduction”,	in:	G.	
Vico,	New Science,	 pp.	XI–XXXIII;	L.	Fer-





institutions	 is	 nothing	 but	 their	 coming	 into	







The Oxford Handbook of the History of Eth-
ics,	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 Oxford	 2013,	
pp.	 1–20,	 here	 p.	 17.	 See	 also	 D.	 Cairns,	
Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Hon-




ues	in	Homer”,	Journal of Hellenic Studies	90	
(1970),	pp.	121–139;	A.	MacIntyre,	A Short 
History of Ethics,	 Macmillan,	 New	 York	
1966;	R.	Sharples,	“’But	Why	Has	My	Spirit	
Spoken	with	Me	Thus?’:	Homeric	Decision-
Making”,	Greece and Rome	 30	 (1983),	 pp.	
1–7;	B.	Williams, Shame and Necessity,	Uni-
versity	 of	 California	 Press,	 Berkeley	 20082	







R.	 Crisp,	 “Homeric	 Ethics”,	 pp.	 1–2:	 “The	
other	 chapters	 in	 this	 Handbook	 mostly	
concern	 philosophers,	 their	 views,	 and	 their	
works.	 So	 why	 begin	 with	 a	 chapter	 on	 a	
couple	 of	 poems?	One	 reason	 is	 the	 central	
importance	 of	 the	 poems	 in	 the	 history	 of	
philosophy,	 and	 hence	 of	 philosophical	 eth-
ics”.	 Among	 the	 other	 reasons	 given	 here,	
the	problems	of	interpretation	and	translation	
play	a	central	 role.	They	 raise	“issues	about	
the	nature	of	morality	 itself,	 the	human	 self	
and	 agency,	 responsibility,	 shame	 and	 other	
moral	emotions,	and	the	nature	of	 the	virtue	























§	 667	 (“Omero	 con	 l’aggiunto	 perpetuo	
d’irreprensibile	canta	a’	greci	popoli	in	esem-
plo	 d’eroica	 virtù”).	 Both	 Bergin-Fisch	 and	
Marsh	 translate	 “blameless”;	 Pompa	 recurs	




F.	Nicolini,	Commento storico alla seconda 
scienza nuova,	Edizioni	di	Storia	e	Lettertura,	
Roma	1949–1950,	II	vol.,	p.	296:	the	epithet	
“hints	 only	 at	 the	 position	 held	 by	 birth,	 at	







































































This	 problem	 has	 also	 been	 addressed	 by	
Andrea	Battistini	 in	 his	 commentary,	where	
he	goes	 as	 far	 as	 excluding	 that	Vico	might	
have	 had	A.	M.	 Salvini’s	 translation	 (1723)	
in	mind.
20
See	 Bibliothecae S. Angeli ad Nidum ab 
inclyta Brancatiorum familia constructae, et 
ab aliis deinceps auctae catalogus. In quo 
singuli singularium Artium, et Scientiarum 
Libri, qui in quavis fere lingua exstant, Auc-
torumque cognomina ordine alphabetico re-
censentur,	Abbatem	&	Raymundum,	Naples	






Bassi,	 “Introduzione”,	 in:	 eadem,	Canoni di 
mitologia: materiali per lo studio delle fonti 
vichiane,	 Edizioni	 di	 Storia	 e	 Letteratura,	
Rome	 2005,	 pp.	 11–26.	 For	 an	 annotated	




terale dell’Iliade,	 Molini	 e	 Landi,	 Florence	
1809,	pp.	1–33.
21
Homer,	Ilias	seu potius omnia eius quae ex-
tant opera, studio et cura Ob. Giphanii I. 
C. quam emendatissime edita, cum ejusdem 
Scholijs et Indicibus novis, excudebat T. Rihe-
lius,	Argentorati	[1572].	This	octavo	edition,	
although	judged	to	be	inaccurate	both	in	text	




Homer	 which	 he	 possessed;	 see	 Catalogus 






imius,	 egregius,	 inculpatus).	 Other	 editions,	
for	 instance	Homer’s	 Iliad	 edited	by	 Joshua	
Barnes	in	Cambridge	(1711),	tend	to	translate	
the	epithet	consistently	as	 laudatissimus	and	
eximius.	 See	 also	 H.	 Stephanus,	 Thesaurus 













See	 S.	 Lowenstam,	 “Iris	 ‘Queenly’	 Mother	
and	 the	 Problem	 of	 the	 Irrational	 Use	 of	
Homeric	 Epithets”,	Pacific Coast Philology	
(1981),	pp.	39–47.
26
A.	Amory	Parry,	Blameless Aegisthus. A Study 
of	Amumon	and other Homeric epithets,	Brill,	
Leiden	1973,	p.	60,	see	also	p.	157.
27
NS30,	 p.	 253:	 “Ecco	 l’Eroe,	 ch’Omero can-




notes:	G.	Vico, Principi d’una scienza nuova 





§	 667,	 the	 Bergin-Fisch	 translation	 shifts,	







orgoglio,	 e	 fierezza”,	 and	also:	 “i	 primi	 sel-








for	Achilles’	 characteristics	 and	 heroic	 virtue,	 he	 tries	 to	 trace	 the	 not	 yet	
moral	root	of	the	Aristotelian	virtue	of	magnanimity	by	following	the	fil rouge	
of	the	passion	of	anger.31
3. The four cardinal virtues in Hercules: 


































































nied	by	great	vices (appariscenti con grand’immagini di virtù che s’accompagnano con grandi 
vizi),	who	among	the	vulgar	win	a	name	for	true	glory,	like	Alexander	and	Caesar;	still	later,	
the	melancholy	and	reflective	(tristi riflessivi),	like	Tiberius;	finally	the	dissolute	and	shameless	





















Renaissance	 period,	 see	 J.	 Kraye,	 “Pagan	
Virtue	 in	 Pursuit	 of	 Christian	 Happiness:	
Renaissance	 Humanists	 and	 the	 Revival	 of	
Classical	Ethics”,	in:	G.	Althoff	ed.,	Zeichen 
– Rituale – Werte. Internationales Kolloquium 









and	 generous”)	 and	 §	 1101	 (“gl’industriosi	
non	gl’infingardi,	 i	 parchi	 non	gli	 pròdigi,	 i	





































































tory,	 are	 called	 from	 the	 very	 beginning	 “virtues	 of	 the	 senses”	 (virtù per 
sensi),	that	is,	they	are	not	and	cannot	be	the	result	of	reason,	reflection	and	
philosophy:	“in	conclusion,	the	virtues	of	that	first	time	were	like	those	(…)	
admired	by	 the	Scythians,	who	would	 fix	 a	knife	 in	 the	ground	and	adore	
it	 as	 a	god,	 and	 thus	 justify	 their	 killings;	 that	 is,	 they	were	virtues	of	 the	












sauro	(1592–1675)	as	the	title	of	a	section	of	his	work,	La filosofia morale deri-










social,	 and	 political	 institutions,	which	 seems	 to	 imply	 a	 historical	 reading	
of	moral	virtues.	 In	Axiom	VII,	Vico	combines	 this	notion	with	 that	of	 the	
35
Several	 years	 ago	 this	was	 advocated	 by	E.	
Nuzzo,	Tra religione e prudenza: la “filoso-
fia pratica” di Giambattista Vico,	Edizioni	di	
Storia	e	Letteratura,	Rome	2007,	p.	54,	n.	24.
36







tatio	 XVI,	De virtute heroica,	 Theorema	V	
“Extremum Heroicae Virtutis est Feritas seu 
Immanitas quovis vitio deterior”.
39
See	C.	Finzi,	“Giovanni	Pontano,	politica	e	cul-
tura	 in	Napoli	 aragonese”,	Anales de la Fun-









(la mercatanzia),	and	governing	classes	 (la corte),	and	 thus	 the	strength	 (la 









































































on	 the	other,	with	virtues	grounded	 in	a	golden	mean,	Vico	can	unfold	 the	
three	movements	 of	 ideal	 eternal	 history.	Although	 he	 is	 familiar	with	 the	
invocation	to	tread	the	via media,44	advanced	by	one	of	his	“four	authors”,	






Iako je Vicova Nova	znanost	(NZ) bila interpretirana sa stajališta praktičke filozofije, njegovo 
razmatranje moralnih vrlina većinom je bilo zanemareno. U radu ću ukazati na ključnu ulogu 
koju vrline imaju u NZ, gdje je povijest čovječanstva prikazana kao priča o tome kako se razvija­
ju mane i vrline, a domena slobodne volje je usmjerena na mogućnost stvaranja vrlina strasti. 
Ovo baca novo svjetlo na pojmove poput »heterogonije svrha«, veze između »bestionija« i čo-
40
E.	 Tesauro,	 La filosofia morale derivata 









e	 il	 nome	 ad	 altre	 simili	 insanie.	 L’istesso	
dirai	delle	barbare piramidi	dell’Egitto	…	e	












vječanstva, te prijetnje »barbarizma refleksije«. To nam također omogućuje da se fokusiramo 
na fiktivne, mitološke i povijesne ličnosti, koje su primjer njihovih vrlina/mana i koje nude uvid 
u način na koji vrline oblikuju stadije povijesti. Nakon prikaza nekih Vicovih izvora, nastojat ću 
pokazati da Vico vodi blizak dijalog s aristotelovskom tradicijom te interpretira moralne vrline 
kao historijski okvir i hermeneutičko oruđe prikladno za procjenu moralnih stadija ljudske po-





Neue Wissenschaft der Tugenden
Zusammenfassung
Obgleich Vicos Neue	 Wissenschaft (NW) vom Blickwinkel der praktischen Philosophie her 
interpretiert wurde, wurde seine Behandlung moralischer Tugenden weitgehend übersehen. 
Ich verweise auf die zentrale Rolle, die Tugenden in der NW spielen, wo die Geschichte der 
Menschheit als Geschichte darüber dargestellt wurde, wie Laster und Tugenden sich entfalten, 
und die Domäne des freien Willens auf die Möglichkeit der Bildung von Tugenden der Leiden-
schaften konzentriert ist. Dies bringt neues Licht in die Begriffe wie „Heterogonie der Zwecke“, 
Verbindung zwischen den „bestioni“ und der Menschheit sowie Drohung der „Barbarei der 
Reflexion“. Dies ermöglicht uns ebenso, sich auf fiktive, mythologische und historische Persön-
lichkeiten zu fokussieren, die als Beispiel für deren Tugenden/Laster dienen und den Einblick 
in die Art und Weise bieten, wie Tugenden Geschichtsstadien formen. Nach der Schilderung ei-
niger Quellen Vicos trachte ich zu zeigen, Vico führe einen engen Dialog mit der aristotelischen 
Tradition und interpretiere die moralischen Tugenden als einen historischen Rahmen und ein 
hermeneutisches Werkzeug, das sich gut eignet für die Einschätzung moralischer Stadien der 





La science nouvelle des vertus
Résumé
Bien que La	science	nouvelle (SN) de Vico ait été interprétée du point de vue de la philosophie 
pratique, l’étude des valeurs morales a été largement négligée. Dans ce travail, je mets en 
évidence le rôle clé des valeurs dans la SN, oeuvre dans laquelle l’histoire de l’humanité est 
présentée comme le récit de la formation des vices et des vertus et où le domaine de la volonté 
libre est centré sur la possibilité de créer des vertus à partir des passions. Cela met en lumière 
des concepts tels que « hétérogonie des fins », le rapport entre le « bestioni » et l’humanité et les 
dangers du « barbarisme de la réflexion ». Cela nous permet également de nous concentrer sur 
les figures fictives, mythologiques, et historiques qui représentent de manière exemplaire leurs 
vertus/vices et qui nous offrent un aperçu sur la manière dont les vertus forment les stades de 
l’histoire. Après avoir présenté une vue d’ensemble de certaines des sources de Vico, je soutiens 
qu’il engage un dialogue étroit avec la tradition aristotélicienne. Je tente également de montrer 
qu’il interprète les vertus morales comme cadre historique et arme herméneutique propices à 
évaluer les stades moraux de l’histoire de l’évolution de l’humanité sur le chemin de la civilisa-
tion, aussi bien que partant d’elle.
Mots-clés
Giambattista	Vico,	La science nouvelle,	 vertus	morales,	 vices,	 passions,	 tradition	 aristotélicienne,	
histoire,	humanité
